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Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management and
Control for Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer to
Corporate Tax Evasion and Inversion

CHARLES EDWARD ANDREW LINCOLN IV*

INTRODUCTION

Central management and control is the best test for determining
corporate residency because it is the test most likely to accurately reflect
economic reality of a corporate entity.' The place where decisions are made
that affect the core of the business, not where incorporation exists, should
be the most important factor in the tax assessment process.2 The two tests
are the "incorporation test," a legal test, and the "central management
control test," which is a substantive test.3 Many countries combine the two
tests.4 An argument running through this essay is that the control and
management test is more akin to economic reality.
The determination of corporate residency is important, because the
resident country can tax the company on its worldwide income-not just

A.L.B., Harvard University, J.D., Texas A&M University School of Law, LL.M Candidate, May 2017,
University of Amsterdam-IBFD. The author would like to thank his professors and advisers Joanna
Wheeler, Dennis Weber, William Byrnes III, Otto Marres, Peter Wattel, Stef van Weeghel, Bruno
Farinha Aniceto da Silva, Mariken van Hilten, Eric Poelmann, Suzanne Mol-Verver, Jan van de Streek,
Rob Cornelisse, and Hein Vermeulen for their input throughout my LL.M program helping me
understand the facets of international tax law.
1. See Kara Baquizal, The Challenges of Redefining CorporateTax Residence in a Competitive
Global Market, 2012-SUM INSIDE BASIS 3,9 (2012) (footnote omitted) ("'The real business is carried on
where the central management and control actually abides.' In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v.
Howe, Lord Loreburn articulated what is now the leading common law standard regarding corporate
residence."). In the European Union, the EU Merger Directive regulates issues pertaining to moving
corporate residence and
[s]uch a transfer results in genuine economic integration in that Member State. Assuming
that the head office is the 'place of central management and control,' such a transfer would
also imply, under a tax treaty between the two Member States concerned, the transfer of tax
residence. To borrow the terminology used by (the original EC Merger Directive and) the
EU Merger Directive, it may be inferred that, in that situation, the transfer of the registered
and head office of a national converting company (and, consequently, of the tax residence)
would be motivated by 'valid commercial reasons.'
Luca Cerioni, Cross-Border Mobility of Companies in the European Union: Tax Competition and
IncreasedScope for the CCCTB Following Cartesio,64 BULL. INT'L. TAX'N. 636, 641 (2010).
2. See Baquizal, supranote 1, at 4-5.
3. See id
4. See id
5. See infra Part IV.

359

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

360

[Vol. 43

income within its borders. 6 A jurisdiction with a particular tax system can
become a magnate to attract income and business profits from other
countries, unless a company is a permanent establishment in the other
countries or subject to source state taxation, such as dividends or interests. 7
The test for residency can be determined by the incorporation test or the
central management and control test (or a derivative thereof).
Having these various tests can lead to abuse, such as a jurisdiction that
has only adopted the incorporation test and then has a 0% or low tax-this
structure can draw worldwide income to a low tax jurisdiction.9 This would
be considered abuse.o These scenarios have prompted the enactment of
anti-abuse rules."
I. BACKGROUND OF CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL FOR
CORPORATE TAXATION

A. Basis of CorporateTaxation
In Brushaberv. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 12 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that, in relation to the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the "whole purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all
income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of
the source whence the income was derived." 13 Further, the Supreme Court
of the United States gave additional insight into Brushaberin 1988 in South
Carolinav. Baker1 4 when it stated the following in one of the footnotes:
The legislative history merely shows that the words "from whatever
source derived" of the Sixteenth Amendment were not affirmatively
intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have
any other effect on which incomes were subject to federal taxation,
and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to
remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were
otherwise taxable.15

6.

See Baquizal, supranote 1, at 3.

7. See id at 5.
8. See id at 4-5.
9.

See id.

10. See id at 7.
11.

See Baquizal, supra note 1, at 12.

12. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
13. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18 (In other words, the destination and disposition of profits and
capital interests, the location of equity beneficiaries ought to be the most important factor in tax
assessment process).

14. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
15. Baker, 485 U.S. at 522 n.13.
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It should be noted that the central management and control test, as laid
out in De Beers (discussed below), is not directly related to the test used in
the U.S. Tax Code.' 6 However, the 1853 British Income Tax Act (which
appeared several decades prior to the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment) taxed residents of the United Kingdom and the greater
Empire, specifically South Africa,17 based on the source of the income and
the residency of the income.
B. De Beers Case
In De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. Howe,1 9 the King's Bench Division
described De Beers Co. in the following manner:
[De Beers Co.] was incorporated and registered in South Africa.
The office denominated its head office was in Kimberley in the
Cape Colony, and it had an office in London. It owned extensive
diamond mines in South Africa. The essential part of its business
was the sale of the diamonds from its mines to a syndicate of
diamond merchants of London under such conditions as to control
the diamond trade of the world.20
On the appeal from the King's Bench decision in De Beers, the House of
Lords decided that the test for residency of a corporation would be "central
management and control" of the business. 2 1 The losing party, De Beers Co.,
argued that the company should be considered a resident where it is
incorporated, but the court rejected the incorporation test.2 2 Perhaps the
main factors that tipped the scale towards determining that De Beers Co.
had residency in the UK were that the meetings in terms of the business's
contracts were all in England, the London office controlled the negotiation
and signing of contracts, and all majority vote matters were taken care of in
London.23
16. See De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [1906] AC 455, 458 (HL) (appeal taken
from Eng.); see also I.R.C. § 882 (West 2014).
17. See De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. v. Howe, [1905] 2 KB 612, 627 (appeal taken from
Eng.) ("[T]his company does not exercise any trade within the United Kingdom. Its only source of
profit in this kingdom is derived from entering into a contract once a year with a syndicate of diamond
merchants in London.").

18.

See De Beers, [1906] AC at 455, at 457-58 (HL) (describing Schedule D of the second

section of the Income Tax Act of 1853); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Sixteenth Amendment

to the U.S. Constitution was enacted in 1913. Id.
19. De Beers, [1905] 2 KB at 612.
20. Id.
21.

See ROBERT COUZIN, CORPORATE RESIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 47 (2002).

22.

See De Beers, [1906] AC 455, 458 (HL).

23.

See COUZIN, supra note 21, at 46-47.
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C. Reasoning in the De Beers Case
The reason the De Beers decision makes sense is because of the
"economic substance" of the business and where the income was actually
coming from.24 Where agents make payments, negotiate contracts, and
perform other acts of a similar nature is where business is occurring, not
necessarily where it is sourced or mined from originally.2 5 This is the
essential message of the Brushaber holding26 -from the standpoint of the
income tax, the origin of money is irrelevant compared to its ultimate
destination or distribution, setting aside for the moment questions of money
27
laundering and the possible criminal sources of income.
The House of Lords' De Beers opinion does not make this explicit, but
De Beers Co. was set up by English investors-under the direction of Cecil

24.

When determining what exactly economic substance is, the U.S. Tax Court has stated:

Under the economic substance doctrine, a court may disregard a transaction for Federal
income tax purposes if it finds that the taxpayer did not enter into the transaction for a valid
business purpose but rather sought to claim tax benefits not contemplated by a reasonable
application of the language and purpose of the Code or its regulations. The origins of the
economic substance doctrine can be traced back to the Supreme Court's decision in Gregory

v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).

In Gregory, the Court held that a reorganization

complying with formal statutory requirements should be disregarded for tax purposes because
the taxpayer's creation and immediate liquidation of a corporation was an impermissible
attempt to convert ordinary income into capital gain. The Court recognized the taxpayer's
right to minimize taxes through legal means but stated that 'the question for determination is
whether what was done, apart from the tax motive, was the thing which the statute intended.'
The Supreme Court concluded that 'The whole undertaking, though conducted according to
the terms of [the statute], was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance
masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else.'

Palm Canyon X Investments, LLC v. C.I.R., 98 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, 587(2009) (citations omitted).
25.

In discussing what an agent is in the United States, the U.S. Tax Court has stated:

[A]n agent shall be considered regularly to exercise authority to negotiate and conclude

contracts or regularly to fill orders on behalf of his foreign principal only if the authority is
exercised, or the orders are filled, with some frequency over a continuous period of time.
This determination shall be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances in each case,

taking into account the nature of the business of the principal; but, in all cases, the frequency
and continuity tests are to be applied conjunctively. Regularity shall not be evidenced by
occasional or incidental activity. An agent shall not be considered regularly to negotiate and
conclude contracts on behalf of its foreign principal if the agent's authority to negotiate and
conclude contracts is limited only to unusual cases or such authority must be separately
secured by the agent from his principal with respect to each transaction effected.

See InverWorld, Inc. v. C.I.R., 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, 3237-22 (1996).
26. See Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18-19. Of course, the Brushaber case was decided almost a
decade after De Beers was finally decided by the House of Lords. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 1; De Beers,
[1906] AC 455, 455 (HL).
27. See Brushaber,240 U.S. at 18-19.
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Rhodes, an Englishman 28-using English money to profit (at least
primarily) English investors. 2 9 This is why the directors in London
effectively had the last word on all significant corporate decisions.30 If the
governors and directors were really operating primarily in South Africa, De
Beers Co.'s London directors should have effectively been subordinate to
the Cape Town-or Kimberley-directors. 3 1
The court could have probably asked various questions in relation to De
Beers Co.'s business.32 Expenditures in South Africa most likely did not

28.

Lucinda Saunders, Rich and Rare Are the Gems They War: Holding De Beers Accountable

for Trading Conflict Diamonds, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1402, 1407 n.20 (2000) (citations omitted);
TOBIAS KRETSCHMER, DE BEERS AND BEYOND: THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL DIAMOND

CARTEL 1 (1998), http://pages.stem.nyu.edu/-lcabral/teaching/debeers3.pdf.
29.

Saunders, supra note 28, at 1407-08; see KRETSCHMER, supra note 28, at 1.

30. This was also the case in the final House of Lords decision. De Beers, [1905] 2 KB at 61416.
31. Control of the company was divided between "life governors" and "ordinary directors" and
was managed through by-laws, which stated:
(1.) That the course of business respecting technical management of the company's work and
operations at its mines, expenditure for wages, and such like, should be determined upon by
the directors in Kimberley, who should however consult the directors in London on matters

of exceptional importance: (2.) All other expenditure exceeding 25,0001. was to be
determined upon by the majority of all the directors; but the directors in Kimberley with the
sanction of the chairman might under special circumstances incur expenditure not exceeding

at one time 50,0001. in addition. No further expenditure could be incurred unless the
authority of the Kimberley directors was confirmed by the majority of all the directors: (3.)
The policy of the board respecting the disposal of diamonds and other assets, the working or
development of the mines and the output of diamonds, application of profits, and
appointment of directors was to be determined by the majority of all the directors: (5.)

Matters to be determined by the majority of all the directors were to be determined by
resolution to be submitted to meetings of directors in Kimberley and London, and the
decision was to be in accordance with the vote of the majority thus ascertained: (6.) Except as

before provided the directors in Kimberley and the directors in London were to have equal
and concurrent authority. The majority of the directors was always in London. Matters
referred to in by-law 3 were always dealt with in London, and in all important matters under
by-law 5 the majority voting had always been in London. No case had ever occurred where

the directors in Kimberley had overruled the decision of the directors in London. Under
powers conferred upon the directors generally, the directors in London had appointed four
committees to control various departments of the company's business and report to them.

De Beers, [1905] 2 KB at 612-13. This being one of the potential alternate facts that could have could
have changed the court's decision. De Beers, [1905] 2 KB at 623, 625.
32. Relevant questions could have included: Where does the weight of corporate wealth come to
its (more-or-less final) resting place each year? Where are most of the warehousing activities, storage,

and final dispositions of cash dividends (or capital, stock distributions) at the end of each year? Banking
records could be compelled in any audit or review, and the law could compel disgorgement of

improperly paid dividends (or distributions of any kind) if the money could be found, so the residences
of the equity owners of stock may be more important than the directors. However, in the early twentieth
century, as in later times, it can be assumed that these are, for the most part, overlapping categories-all

managing directors are likely to be shareholders, they are normally elected by shareholders, and certainly
their interests are closely aligned by principles of fiduciary duty with all of their shareholders. De Beers,
[1905] 2 KB at 625-27.
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show what the source of the wealth of the De Beers Co. mines was.33
Incorporation in South Africa may have been a management convenience in
an effort to make expenditures more efficient, given that most-if not allof the mining activity was in South Africa, but it had nothing to do with the
destiny of the diamonds extracted from the mines.34
D. Elements of Central Management and Control and De Beers's
Posterity
The De Beers rule for residency of a corporation was upheld almost half
a century later in Unit Construction Co. v. Bullock, which continued to
apply the central control and management test.3 6 However, the case further
noted that this test for residency can be broken up into two elements:
management and control.37
Given this, Robert Couzin lays out three indicators for determining
central management and control:
1. Strategic management - e.g. what a supervisory board does in a
two-tier board system as in certain continental legal systems. Under
UK law, strategic management is entrusted to the board of directors.
2. Actual or effective management, which is the implementation of
strategic management - e.g. what a management board does in a
two-tier board system. In the United Kingdom, this management is
exercised by the highest-ranking corporate executives.
3. Junior and shop floor management - the immediate supervision
of day-to-day operations.3 8
The De Beers case was essentially the rule for corporate residency in
commonwealth countries until 1988.39 In 1988, the United Kingdom also
added incorporation as a test for taxation in addition to the De Beers rule.40

33. Id. at 625.
34. Id. at 612.
35. [1960] AC 351 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).
36.

"If the De Beers case applies in such cases, it should apply here." Unit Construction Co.,

[1960] AC 351, at 357 (HL) (footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 356.
38.
39.

COUZIN, supra note 21, at 58.
HUGH J. AULT ET AL., COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 435 (3d

ed. 2010).
40. Corporation Tax Act 2009, c. 3,

§§

14-15 (Eng.).
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THE OECD TEST FOR RESIDENCY

In the OECD Model Convention, Article 4(1) states that that a resident
is a person (or entity) who is liable41 to taxation through the domestic laws
of that country.42 In terms of residency for an individual, Article 4(2) states
that if the domestic laws cannot lead to a conclusion, then a four-step
analysis will commence.4 3 The analysis starts where the permanent home is
and then where personal and economic relations are closer (center of vital
interests). It next looks to where the habitual abode is, and then the state in
which the person is a national. If the question is still unsettled, the states
will resolve the determination by mutual agreement."
III. COUNTER ARGUMENT TO CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL VIA
STEF VAN WEEGHEL'S INCORPORATION TEST ARGUMENT FOR CORPORATE
RESIDENCY

In a sense, central control and management is similar to effective

management.4 5 Indeed, the words seem to have similar connotations. For
example, The Netherlands "gives great weight to the place of effective

41. The word "liable" is separate from the definition of subject to tax.
The primary definition of 'liable' in the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), derived from
legal usage, refers to the circumstance in which a person is bound or obliged by law or
equity, is 'legally subject or amenable to'. One of the examples in the OED definition refers
to categories of goods that are 'liable to duties'. That would suggest a meaning more in the
nature of actual than potential liability. The OED also, however,.defines 'liable' as 'exposed
or subject to, or likely to suffer from (something prejudicial)'. Examples of the latter usage
include expressions such as 'liable to disturbance' or, perhaps closer to the context of
taxation, 'lyable [sic] for all wilde [sic] beasts to come in and to devour her'.
COUZIN, supranote 21, at 106-07.
42. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Model Tax Convention with Respect to Taxes
on Income and on Capital: Condensed Version, art. 4, para. 1 (2014).
43. Id
44. Id.
45. Effective management and control is similar but can be different from central management
and control:
There is a measure of similarity, notionally, between the place where 'central management
and control' of a corporation is exercised and its 'place of effective management', although
the two notions are not necessarily the same. The former is commonly seen to focus more
directly, and possibly even exclusively, on legal governance considerations, while latter is
seen to comport with a more operational test. In fact, however, taking account of the genesis
of the central-management-and-control test and, particularly, the English corporate law
context in which it which it [sic] developed, the two notions are probably more proximate,
and more focused on business operations contrasted with corporate law procedure, than may
be generally acknowledged.
J. Scott Wilkie, Substance in InternationalTaxation, 21 INT'L. TRANSFER PRICING J. 362, 363 (2014).
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management-that is, where the day-to-day management takes place.'- 6
This can take various shapes and forms, which are completely similar to
central management and control: where the business directors and head
office are located, etc. 4 7 The OECD Commentary on Article 4, Paragraph 3,
Commentary at Paragraph 4 (known as the tie breaker rule) also says that
the "place of effective management is the place where key management and
commercial decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity's
business as a whole are in substance made." 4 8
At this point there seems to be a two-tiered analysis of management in
common law countries: the decision level and the management level.4 9 As a
counter-argument to "central control and management"-but more
specifically to effective management-Stef van Weeghel argues that:
there is an increasing tendency to omit the tie-breaker provision
from the treaty and to leave the solution of cases of dual residence
to the mutual agreement procedure. Both tendencies underscore the
need to rethink the place of effective management as a useful
criterion. A formal criterion, such as incorporation, while rejected
50
by the Commentary, could be the answer ....
Van Weeghel presents three problems with the effective management test."
First, there could be a "top holding company with an international board."5 2
This international board would be composed of a diverse combination of
nationals and foreign residents, whereby it would be difficult to determine
where the effective management actually is. 5 3 Second, van Weeghel argues
that a centrally managed multinational company may have difficulty
central
effective
which country
subsidiaries have
ascertaining
management.54 Van Weeghel states that the challenge is "whether the
operating subsidiaries have their effective management in the country of
their stated residence or in fact all have their residence in the country of the
parent company."
46.

AULT ET AL., supranote 39, at 436.

47. Id.
48. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., Commentaries on the Articles of the Model Tax
Convention: Condensed Version, art. 4, para. 24 (2010).
49. COuZIN, supra note 21, at 58.
50. Here, the place of incorporation can be seen as a counter argument to central management
and control. Stef van Weeghel, Chapter 10 Article 4(3) of the OECD Model Convention: An
Inconvenient Truth, in 5 RESIDENCE OF COMPANIES UNDER TAX TREATIES AND EC LAW 307

(Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2009).
51. Id. at 305.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55.

van Weeghel, supranote 50, at 305.
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Third, van Weeghel states that the OECD has not resolved problems
with holding companies and similar entities that may act as artificial
companies where no actual effective control exists, but it is there as more of
a formality.56 In this case, actual effective control would be through the
parent company.57 Overall, the greatest advantage of incorporation as a test
for residence is that it promotes predictability; the residency will always be
known. The United States uses this approach when corporate residency is
used for determining taxation.59
COUNTERARGUMENT, SUPPORTING EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND
IV.
CONTROL, IN RESPONSE TO VAN WEEGHEL'S COUNTERARGUMENT,
SUPPORTING THE INCORPORATION TEST FOR RESIDENCY

A counterargument to van Weeghel's arguments is that incorporation as
the sole test for residency can sometimes be abused. 6 0 Even in the De Beers
case itself, the court observed that a company may "escape the appropriate
taxation by the simple expedient of being registered abroad and distributing
its dividends abroad." 6 1 One of the main reasons the analysis of De Beers
makes sense is because the place of incorporation is not always where
profits are earned or where decisions are made.62 It could merely be a piece
Van Weeghel's first two points concerning the
of paper in a registry.
diversity of the board and the "actual" management of multinationals can be
classified into a single criterion of promoting efficiency.6 Indeed, using the
place of incorporation as the only test for residency provides the most
efficient results.65

5 6. Id.
57. Id.
58.

"Place of incorporation as the test for residence-based corporate taxation presents some

advantages, notably predictability." COUZIN, supranote 21, at 260.
59. "The United States currently uses a legal status test alone for entities, sometimes known as
the place of incorporation rule." Adam H. Rosenzweig, Source as a Solution to Residence, 17 FLA. TAX

REV. 471, 480 (2015). "Under existing U.S. income tax and corporate law, being a U.S. company
generally means having incorporated in one of the fifty states (or the District of Columbia)." Daniel
Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64
TAX L. REV. 377, 397 (2010).

60. See De Beers, [1906] AC 455, at 458 (HL).
61.

Id; see CouzIN, supra note 21, at 260.

62. See De Beers, [1906] AC 455, at 458 (H1L).
63. "Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the assumption of identity between the place of
incorporation, source of income, and the residency of shareholders or managers seemed not at all
obvious." Omri Marian, The Function of Corporate Tax-Residence in TerritorialSystems, 18 CHAP. L.
REv. 157, 172 (2014).

64. See van Weeghel, supranote 50, at 305.
65. See Omri Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1620 (2013)
[hereinafter Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations].
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However, "if one accepts that the purpose of corporate taxation is to
impose tax burdens on corporate shareholders," 66 then shareholdersthrough directors-can retain profits without ever having to distribute the
profits.67 In response to this corporate retention of profits, a jurisdiction
could enact laws to tax retained profits. 6 8 However, this is different from
the place of incorporation tax; it is really effective management (or central
management and control), which is what was argued previously. 6 9
Although efficiency would be the main goal, it is not necessarily the proper
means of collecting revenue, because corporate directors could easily move
around that goal. 7 0 Alternatively, if the goal is to avoid taxation, the
shareholders-through the directors-could just incorporate in a new
jurisdiction.71
A counterargument to van Wheegel's third point indicates that proper
anti-abuse rules would need to be put in place to counter-act artificial
arrangements through GAARs or SAARs.72 Contrary to van Wheegel's
66. Id at 1623.
67. Consider the following explanation:
Assume that Jurisdiction C ("C") does not impose corporate income tax, but does impose
income tax on individuals. To avoid individual income taxes, residents of C regularly operate
their businesses through closely held corporations. Instead of distributing the profits earned
by their corporations-which would result in the imposition of individual income tax-C's
residents retain their profits at the corporate level, where they remain untaxed.

Id at 1623-24.
68. Id at 1624.
69. Id at 1621, 1625.
70.

Marian noted that:

This result makes C's corporate tax-residence test meaningless, specifically because it is

based on the normative justification of efficiency, and particularly because efficiency is
achieved. By adopting the most efficient model, C avoided behavioral distortions, but
completely defeated the purposes for which C enacted corporate tax in the first place.
residents can still avoid tax on retained profits.

C's

Marian,Jurisdictionto Tax Corporations,supranote 65, at 1624.

71. See id. at 1629 & n.63; Episode 390: We Set up an Offshore Company in a Tax Haven, NPR
(July 27, 2012, 6:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/07/27/157499893/episode-39ft-we-setup-an-offshore-company-in-a-tax-haven (illustrating the ease in which one could set up offshore
companies by describing how simple it was for NPR staff to call to set up wholly owned corporations in
tax havens).
72. See van Weeghel, supra note 50, at 305. As a general definition, "[A]n anti-abuse rule is a

rule designed to prevent a taxpayer from achieving a result which is inconsistent with a dominant policy
of the law by altering the tax consequences which would otherwise have flowed from a transaction, to
others more consistent with that policy." Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Appropriateness ofAnti-Abuse Rules

in the U.S. Income Tax Systems, 48 TAx LAW. 801, 802 (1995); see Jose Manuel Calder6n, The Spanish
TransferPricing Regime and the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 70 BULL. INT'L.

TAX'N 430, 430 (2016) ("[T]he application of the general anti-abuse rules (GAAR),fraus legis (abuse of
law), anti-sham transactions and recharacterization provisions, as well as the inversion of the burden of
proof with regard to the reality and economic rationality of any structure were the primary mechanisms
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promotion of incorporation as the best and most efficient test for corporate
residency, anti-avoidance rules can frequently "deter legitimate business
transactions." 73 Often, anti-avoidance rules do not even stop artificial
arrangements from occurring.74
GENERAL REMARK ON THE GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH
V.
INCORPORATION AND CORPORATE INVERSIONS

Corporate inversion is generally only possible with an incorporation
test, such as the one used in the United States. It has also been found to be
more difficult to conduct a corporate inversion with the management and
control test.76

Van Weeghel's third point for setting up anti-abuse rules

&

for the tax regularization and the reassessment of inbound transactions."); Genevieve Loutinsky,
Gladwellian Taxation: Deterring Tax Abuse Through General Anti-Avoidance Rules, 12 HOuS. Bus.
TAX L. J. 82, 85 (2012) (footnotes omitted) ("SAARs are targeted at narrow, 'specific areas where abuse

has been previously identified or revenue leakage is suspected. Often, SAARs are tied to or inserted into
a specific section of a nation's revenue code.

However, SAAR's weakness is its specificity.

Additionally, the SAAR is further abated by the fact that it is easily avoided and incorporated into new
avoidance activities. In contrast, GAAR's strength is its applicability to particular sections or even the
entire revenue code. Its broad language has resulted in its labeling as essentially the 'carpet bomb' to a

SAAR's 'smart bomb."').
73. "The principal argument against anti-abuse rules is that they will deter legitimate business
transactions." Battle, supra note 72, at 806.
74. As illustrated by the following example, anti-avoidance rules can often be circumvented
through complicated tax codes and tax planning techniques:
Consider another example. Corporation C has a large built-in loss in its operating assets. It
transfers all of its assets to a partnership-Ahe other assets of which consist of traded
securities. Now assume that C sells its partnership interest to either one of the other partners
or to a third party. No section 754 election is made. Do the remaining partners obtain the
benefit of the built-in loss in the assets received from C, even though they could not have
realized those benefits had they purchased the stock of C? Simply applying the mechanical
rules of Subchapter K produces the duplicated loss. Example 10 of the anti-abuse regulations
seems close to this case. However, the facts of example 10 suggest a contrived transactionsomething different from what appears on the surface. Family members form the partnership,
and there is at least a suggestion that changes in values of property over time will not be
taken into account by the parties in allocating income and loss. Will this example stop
transactions such as that posed here? One wonders.

Id (footnotes omitted).
75. See Douglas Chiu, Note, Inversion Subversion: CorporateInversions and the New Federal
Laws Against Them, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 717, 730-31 (2015). The definition of corporate
inversion is as follows: "Corporate inversions are the act of American corporations legally redomiciling
[sic] to a foreign jurisdiction to lessen their corporate tax burden. While the practice has waxed and
waned over the past decades, inversions were on the upswing in 2014, with several of America's leading
corporations at various stages of inverting." Id. at 717.
76. See id at 725. New acts proposed by Congress show that a form of the management and
control test are key to ending corporate inversions by changing the

[T]hreshold for surrogate foreign corporations [which] would lower the threshold of stock
ownership by legacy shareholders from 60 percent to 50 percent. Further, the Act would
lower the general threshold of I.R.C. § 7874(b) from eighty percent to sixty percent. The Act
also includes limitations on American management and control of the new foreign
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would presumably be a counter argument against the problems that have
been created with corporate inversions.77 However, the United States has
spent years trying to develop anti-abuse rules for corporate inversions while
corporations have continued to find ways around these rules. 78 One such

rule is the controlled foreign legislation rule with an 80% rule for
determining whether the foreign incorporated company will be recognized
as a United States company.79 If such a company has conducted a corporate
inversion and meets the controlled foreign company status, it will be taxed
in the United States as a resident of the country and as a domestic
corporation.80 In addition, there is a 60% test of stock ownership for
determining whether the corporation can claim tax benefits in the United
States for at least ten years.81
Under I.R.C. Section 7874,82 there are two types of corporate inversions
(the 60% and 80% inversions), but there are also three criteria to examine
corporation if, 'the management and control of the expanded affiliated group . . . occurs,
directly or indirectly, primarily within the United States, and such expanded affiliated group

has significant domestic business activities,' then the foreign corporation would be
considered an inverted domestic corporation.

Id. at 732 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
77.

See generallyvan Weeghel, supra note 50.

78.

See Chiu, supra note 75, at 721. Indeed, there is an extensive legislative history and push to

end corporate loopholes for avoiding taxation. See generally id. "Historically, both expatriated
corporations and the federal government have played a cat-and-mouse game in which the government
passes legislation intended to respond to and suppress each corporate inversion.
In response,
corporations have developed different forms of inversions to get through loopholes in the law." Id. at

726.
79.

See id. at 733, 736. The rules for foreign controlled corporations are summarized as follows:

Even if the nullification argument applied on these facts, it would fail nonetheless. There are
several provisions in the Code that test control using vote and value thresholds of 50% or
80%. If a stockholder's election of an independent director was not attributed to its voting
power, then corporations could structure their boards so that the voting thresholds would
never be reached, as in the proposed scenario in Hermes Consol., and the parties would have
to rely solely on the value test. Thus, the voting power test could be easily manipulated and
rendered unnecessary. In addition, the requirement for an independent director is ubiquitous.
All stock exchanges require independent directors as members of the board and the audit
committee. Therefore, all publicly traded companies would be subject to control tests that
discounted votes for independent directors, thereby distorting voting power percentage.

Fish v. C.I.R., 106 T.C.M. (CCH) 608, 614 n.27 (2013).
80. See Chiu, supra note 75, at 728. "In an 80% inversion, the transferee foreign corporation is
treated as a domestic corporation for all purposes of the Code and for all U.S. treaty obligations." D.
Kevin Dolan et al., What's Wrong with the New Anti-Inversion Rules?, 16 J. INT'L TAX'N 52, 60 (2005).

81.

See Chiu, supra note 75, at 728. "With regard to an expatriated entity involved in a 60%

inversion, for the ten years following the final acquisition of properties for purposes of the Acquisition
Test, the entity cannot use any tax attributes (e.g., deductions, losses, or credits) to offset any inversion
gain." Dolan et al., supra note 80, at 61.

82. I.R.C. § 7874 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-329). The rules are relating to expatriated
entities and their foreign parents. See generally id
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when determining corporate inversions: the Acquisition Test, Stock
Ownership Test, and Business Activities Test. 83 The Acquisition Test
criterion determines whether "a foreign corporation ('transferee foreign
corporation') must make a direct or indirect acquisition of substantially all
of the properties held directly or indirectly by a domestic corporation." 8 4
The Stock Ownership Test criterion determines that "[a]fter the transferee
foreign corporation's acquisition, former shareholders of the domestic
corporation must own at least 60% (or 80%) of the aggregate vote or value
in the transferee foreign corporation's stock."85 Moreover, the "former
shareholders must have acquired their interests in the transferee foreign
corporation 'by reason of holding stock in the domestic corporation.'"8 6
The last criterion, the Business Activities Test, states "that after the
transferee foreign corporation's acquisition, the expanded affiliated group
(discussed above) that includes the transferee foreign corporation must not
have 'substantial business activities' in the jurisdiction in which the
transferee foreign corporation is created or organized as compared with the
The three
expanded affiliated group's worldwide business activities."8
tests are used to determine whether any transaction has conducted a
corporate inversion.88
Overall, the corporate inversion matrix has proven to be complicated,
because it is a less effective method as a matter of policy to end the
problems with corporate inversions. 89 If the policy is to avoid corporate
inversion and to avoid tax evasion, then the United States-and other

83. I.R.C. §§ 7874(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I)-(II) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-329); I.R.C.
7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-329).
84.

§

Dolan et al., supranote 80, at 54.

The 'direct or indirect' acquisition language clearly contemplates the acquisition of either the
stock or assets of a domestic corporation. In addition, the 'indirect' language would appear
broad enough to apply to a triangular reorganization in which a domestic acquiring
corporation acquires the stock or assets of a domestic target in exchange for the stock of a
foreign corporation that controls the domestic acquiror.

Id.
85.
regardless
8 6.
87.

Id. at 55. "The provision looks to all 'former shareholders' in the domestic corporation
of whether they are domestic.or foreign persons." Id.
Id.
Dolan et al., supra note 80, at 58-59; see also I.R.C. § 7874. In summing up the two tests for

eighty percent and sixty percent, Dolan writes, "There are 80% percent inversions and 60% percent
inversions, with the percentages measuring continuity of shareholder interest. The three criteria are the

'Acquisition Test,' 'Stock Ownership Test,' and 'Business Activities Test.' The three tests are applied
taking into account any plan or series of related transactions." Dolan et al., supranote 80, at 54.

88. Id. at 54.
89. Id. at 61 ("Whatever the policy merits of curbing inversion transactions, the legislation is a
poor tool in carrying out that policy.").
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countries using solely the incorporation method as a test for residencyshould adopt the central management and control test.90
VI.

GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATION AND EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT

With both types of tests, tax planning can yield a variation in where the
tax is being assessed.9 1 Such a scenario includes treaty shopping and setting
up conduit companies such as those in The Netherlands. 92 However, the
United States and other countries can set up limitations of benefits (L.O.B.)
clauses to combat the abuse of conduits in places such as The Netherlands,
which has low withholding tax rates. 93 In response to this, a corporation
could adopt a business structure that would utilize banks that are wellestablished in countries-such as The Netherlands-leaving the U.S. and
other countries to examine where the beneficial owners are operating and if
they are really of the original country. 94
CONCLUSION

Overall, De Beers's central management and control seems to provide
the best formulation as a single test to determine corporate residency.9 5
However, from a policy point of view, in terms of raising revenue, a study
should be conducted examining separate jurisdictions that apply different
approaches. This would allow countries to see which ones are the most
efficient, and which ones collect the most revenue. Depending on the
government's policy, a jurisdiction could use this statistical data to examine
which method is the most beneficial.
If raising the most amount of revenue is possible, then the standard that
generates the most would be ideal. However, if the most efficient method is
favored, the one that is determined to be most efficient should control. Yet
this would fall into a greater matrix, because the jurisdictions may have
other tax rules or an economic infrastructure that make a jurisdiction
favorable for investments or like transactions. Ultimately, there can be
other complications and factors to consider, such as whether to use a
territorial system such as that of France for corporations.9 6

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Marian, Jurisdictionto Tax Corporations,supra note 65, at 1643.
See generally Baquizal, supranote 1.
See id at 15.
See id. at 14-15.
See generally id.
See id. at 14.
See AULT ET AL., supra note 39, at 436.

